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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 15, 2013, two bombs exploded at the finish line of the Boston Marathon.1 The bombs, made out of pressure cookers, explosive powder from fireworks, shrapnel, adhesive, and other materials,2 left three dead
and hundreds of others seriously injured.3 The bombing left the city of Boston—and the world—in shock. How could someone do something so hor*
Andrea MacIver is a licensed attorney in Chicago, Illinois currently clerking for
the Honorable Justice Nathaniel Howse Jr. in the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.
1.
Indictment at ¶ 6, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13 CR 10200, 2013 WL
3215742 (D. Mass. June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Tsarnaev Indictment].
2.
Id. at ¶ 8.
3.
Deborah Feyerick, Ross Levitt & Matt Smith, Boston bomb suspect pleads not
guilty, CNN.COM (July 11, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/10/us/bostonbombing-case/index.html?iref=allsearch. See Tsarnaev Indictment, supra note 1, at ¶ 7.
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rific to innocent men, women, and children on one of Boston’s most celebrated days, Patriot’s Day?4 In the days following the bombings, officials
worked tirelessly to figure out that question, and they did. The bombers
were Russian brothers, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev.5 Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older twenty-six-year-old brother, was killed following
an altercation with the police during which Dzhokhar Tsarnaev allegedly
contributed to Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s death by running over him in a vehicle.6 The younger brother, nineteen-year-old Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, survived
and will live to face the consequences of his actions.7 However, before he
faces those consequences, prosecutors and defense attorneys are going to
have to answer some tough questions. Should Dzhokhar receive the death
penalty? What will Dzhokhar’s defense be? Why did Dzhokhar kill innocent people? What was motivating him? What role did his older brother
have in planning and carrying out the bombings? Another question that may
not be at the forefront of the litigation, but deserves addressing, is: was
there something about nineteen-year-old Dzhokhar’s brain that made him
more susceptible to engaging in such horrific acts? And, if so, does that
make him any more fit or less fit for the death penalty?
The United States’ legal system has constantly been confronted with
how it should deal with and punish youth8 who commit crimes. At one
point, age had almost no bearing on one’s sentence, and a child of at least
seven years could be sentenced to death if he or she committed a heinous
enough crime.9 However, flash forward to 2013 and the Supreme Court of
the United States has placed significant limits on the sentences that may be
imposed on youth under the age of eighteen: they cannot be sentenced to
death, they cannot automatically receive life without the possibility of parole, and they cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
for nonhomicide crimes.10 The driving factor behind these limitations has
been, in large part, new scientific studies regarding the development of a
4.
5.

Tsarnaev Indictment, supra note 1, at ¶ ¶ 3-4.
Wayne Drash, Acquaintances: The brain behind bombings is older brother,
CNN.COM (Apr. 23, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/21/us/tsarnaevbrothers-relationship/index.html?iref=allsearch.
6.
See Feyerick et al., supra note 3; Drash, supra note 5.
7.
Feyerick et al., supra note 3.
8.
Throughout this Article, the terms “youth,” “minor,” and “juvenile” will be used
interchangeably. For purposes of this Article, unless specified otherwise or when using the
terms to discuss judicial opinions, this term refers to persons nearing their mid-twenties and
younger.
9.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (recognizing that children under the age of
seven were considered to be incapable of possessing criminal intent and, thus, capital punishment was theoretically permitted for anyone over the age of seven).
10.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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youth’s brain. New developments in MRI imaging have made it possible to
safely and effectively image a youth’s brain, leading to the scientific finding that, contrary to what scientists originally thought, a youth’s brain is
generally not fully developed until the youth’s early- to mid-twenties.11
This lack of development in a youth’s brain greatly affects their ability to
make rational decisions, their culpability for their actions, and their ability
to grow out of any criminal tendencies. As a result, it makes sense why the
Supreme Court of the United States has limited the most serious legal punishments from being imposed on minors. However, if the studies show that
the brain is not fully developed until one’s early- to mid-twenties—which is
exactly what the studies show—why has the Supreme Court drawn the line
for these harshest penalties at the age of eighteen? The obvious answer is to
save judicial resources and ensure consistency in sentencing across the
board. This is why our country has sentencing statutes, of course. And
while it is understandable why lines need to be drawn—even seemingly
arbitrary lines—when that line is the difference between life and death,
should that line be given a little more consideration?
Part A of this Article analyzes the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment and, specifically, how it has been interpreted in cases involving youth over the years.12 Part B discusses new scientific studies regarding the development of the brain, and takes an in-depth
look at the recent scientific findings that show the brain does not fully develop until a youth’s early- to mid-twenties.13 Part C discusses how these
studies have found their way into the Supreme Court’s rulings in Roper v.
Simmons, Graham v. Alabama and Miller v. Alabama.14 Part D discusses
the implications of the clash between science and the law for juvenile offenders who commit crimes after the age of eighteen, but before their early-

11.
Ann Maclean Massie, Suicide on Campus: The Appropriate Legal Responsibility of College Personnel, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 661 (2008); Adam Ortiz, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Juvenile Death Penalty: Adolescence, Brain Development, and Legal
Culpability, 2004 A.B.A. JUV. JUST. CENTER 1 (Jan. 2004), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newslette
r/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheckdam.pdf; Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick,
DEATH PENALTY INFORM. CENTER (May 10, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/whatmakes-teens-tick-flood-hormones-sure-also-host-structural-changes-brain-can-those-explainbehav; Jen Christensen, Are you a heavy drinker? You’d be surprised, CNN.COM (June 27,
2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/26/health/heavy-drinking-definition/ (“The
frontal cortex -- the part of the brain that helps you make decisions and control impulsivity –
doesn’t develop fully until you are 25.”).
12.
See infra notes 16-96 and accompanying text.
13.
See infra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
14.
See infra notes 135-152 and accompanying text.
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to mid-twenties, with a focus on nineteen-year-old Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.15

II. BACKGROUND
A.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF YOUTH AND CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment
states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”16 This provision is applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The right encompassed
in the Eighth Amendment “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’”18 “By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the
Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the
dignity of all persons.”19 While this principle is easily understood in theory,
the application of this principle has proven to be more difficult as courts
constantly grapple with the scope and reach of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.20

1.

Stanford v. Kentucky

In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that it was not cruel and unusual punishment to sentence sixteen- and seventeen-years-olds convicted of murder to death.21 “A divided [Stanford]
Court rejected the proposition that the Constitution bars capital punishment
for juvenile offenders” older than fifteen but younger than eighteen.22 In
coming to this conclusion, “[t]he Court noted that 22 of the 37 death penalty States permitted the death penalty for 16-year-old offenders, and, among

15.
See infra notes 154-187 and accompanying text.
16.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
17.
ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 8:18 (3d ed. 2004).
18.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
Atkins v. Virginia., 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 367 (1910))).
19.
Id.
20.
CAMPBELL, supra note 17. (“Because its core concept [of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause] remains largely subjective, the Eighth Amendment ha[s] been frequently
invoked by offenders and diversely applied by the courts. Only in death sentences had the
High Court applied it with relative clarity, consistency, and frequency.”).
21.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
22.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 556 (commenting on the holding in Stanford).
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these 37 States, 25 permitted it for 17-year-old offenders.”23 As such, the
Court found that “there was no national consensus sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.”24
On the same day the Court decided Stanford, it also decided Penry v.
Lynaugh, which held that the Eighth Amendment also did not mandate a
categorical ban on the death penalty for persons who are mentally retarded.25 In coming to this conclusion, the Court found that only two states had
banned the imposition of the death penalty on those who are mentally retarded and that was not “sufficient evidence . . . of a national consensus.”26
Further, despite arguments from Penry’s attorneys that sentencing a mentally retarded person to death was the effective equivalent of sentencing a seven-year-old child to death, the Court held that it could not “conclude that
the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded
person of Penry’s ability convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of
his or her mental retardation.”27

2.

Atkins v. Virginia

Flash forward fourteen years to 2002 and the Supreme Court, in Atkins
v. Virginia, held that the execution of mentally retarded offenders was cruel
and unusual punishment and such a punishment would violate the Eighth
Amendment.28 In coming to this conclusion, the Atkins Court found that
mental retardation diminishes personal culpability, even where the offender
may be able to distinguish right from wrong.29 Similarly, the Court found
that the impairments of mentally retarded offenders make it less defensible
to impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes as imposing the
death penalty is less likely to have any real deterrent effect.30 Based on
23.
Id. at 562.
24.
Id. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
26.
Id. at 334.
27.
Id. at 340.
28.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
29.
Id. at 318.
30.
Id. at 319-20.
[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only
subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and
self-direction that became manifest before age 18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right
and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their
impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
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those findings, the Court concluded that there was a national consensus
against executing mentally retarded persons, despite its finding to the contrary a decade earlier, and held that imposing the death penalty on mentally
retarded offenders would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.31

3.

Roper v. Simmons

In Roper v. Simmons, the Court reconsidered the question of whether
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause permitted
the execution of a juvenile offender who was over the age of fifteen but
younger than eighteen.32 In Roper, seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons murdered a woman.33 Nine months later, at the age of eighteen, Simmons was tried and sentenced to death.34 Prior to the murder, Simmons had
discussed his plan to murder the victim with two friends, Charles Benjamin
and John Tessmer.35 Together, the group of friends carried out the plan,36
which involved breaking and entering into the woman’s house, tying up her
hands and feet, placing duct tape over her eyes and mouth, transporting her
to the state park, and throwing her body from a bridge into the Meramec
River, where she drowned.37 Simmons bragged about the murder before he
was arrested at school, and he openly discussed the murder after being arrested.38
The State charged Simmons with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and
first-degree murder and sought the death penalty as punishment.39 In supengage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are
more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but
there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group
settings they are followers rather than leaders.
Id. at 318.
31.
Id. at 321. “Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in light of our
‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive
and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the
life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1986)).
32.
As stated above, the Court had previously found in 1989 that executing such a
juvenile did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
33.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005).
34.
Id. at 556.
35.
Id.
36.
Charles Benjamin assisted Simmons in the murder, but John Tessmer left before
the two had departed for the woman’s home. Id.
37.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57.
38.
Id. at 557.
39.
Id.
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port of its request for the death penalty, the State presented the following
aggravating evidence: “[T]he murder was committed for the purpose of
receiving money; was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with, or preventing lawful arrest of the defendant; and involved depravity of
mind and was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhumane.”40
The defense argued that Simmons’s young age should serve as a mitigation
factor to his sentence, “remind[ing] the jurors that juveniles of Simmons’
[sic] age cannot drink, serve on juries, or even see certain movies, because
‘the legislatures have wisely decided that individuals of a certain age aren’t
responsible enough.’”41 Yet, despite these arguments, Simmons was sentenced to death.42 Simmons challenged his conviction and sentence claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.43 The court found
that no constitutional violations occurred in the handling of his case and
denied him post-conviction relief.44 Simmons appealed this finding, but the
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.45 The federal
courts also denied Simmons’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.46
Following what would have appeared to be the end of Simmons’s efforts for post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia. Atkins, as stated earlier, held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution of mentally retarded persons. Based upon
the holding in Atkins, Simmons filed a new petition for post-conviction
relief claiming that the Constitution prohibited the execution of an offender
who was under the age of eighteen at the time he committed the crime.47
The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Simmons’s argument, and the
United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the issue.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding, and found that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on
an offender who was under the age of eighteen at the time he or she committed the crime.48 The Court based its decision, which was a deviation
from its past holdings, upon the following eight propositions:
(1) “The evidence of national consensus against the
death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005).
Id. at 560.
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respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against
the death penalty for the mentally retarded.”49
(2) “Second, Congress considered the issue when
enacting the Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994,
and determined that the death penalty should not
extend
to
juveniles.”50
(3) “As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case . . . provide[d] sufficient evidence
that today our society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”51
(4) General maturity-related differences between
juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrated that
“juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified
among
the
worst
offenders.”52
(5) The reasoning applied by a plurality of the
court concerning the immaturity of people under
the age of 16 in Thompson v. Oklahoma—where
the court had held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed when offenders were under 16—
applied
to
all
offenders
under
18.53
(6) Once the diminished culpability of juveniles
was recognized, it was “evident that the penological justifications [(restitution and deterrence)] for
the death penalty appl[ied] to them with lesser
force
than
to
adults.”54
(7) “The age of 18 is the point where society draws
the line for many purposes between childhood and

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 564.
Id. at 567.
Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
Id. at 574 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)).
Id. at 571.
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adulthood.”55
(8) “[T]he United States [was] the only country in
the world that continue[d] to give official sanction
to the juvenile death penalty.”56
Although much of the Roper decision focused upon the international and
national consensus regarding the death penalty and juveniles,57 the opinion
also made it clear that the Court had taken into consideration the “diminished culpability of juveniles” in its ruling.58 Specifically, the Court noted:
(1) “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young[,]”59 (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure[,]” and
(3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”60
The Court further noted that “these differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.”61 The Court also
pointed out that the deterrent effect of imposing the death penalty was weak
with teenagers because teenage offenders are not likely to make the same
cost-benefit analysis as adults prior to committing crimes.62
In acknowledging that the Court in Roper was making a break from
past precedent, Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsberg made the following
remarks in their concurring opinion:
Perhaps even more important than our specific
holding today is our reaffirmation of the basic
principle that informs the Court’s interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment. If the meaning of that
Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would pose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today.63

55.
Id. at 574.
56.
Id. at 575.
57.
The court recognized that at the time Roper was decided, nationally thirty states
prohibited the death penalty for juveniles, and internationally the United States was the only
county in the world that had not “turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.” Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557 (2005).
58.
Id. at 571.
59.
Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
60.
Id. at 569-70.
61.
Id. at 570.
62.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005).
63.
Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Further, “[i]n the best tradition of common law, the pace of evolution is a
matter for continuing debate; but that our understanding of the Constitution
does change from time to time has been settled since John Marshall
breathed life into its text.”64
However, despite the Court’s efforts in legitimizing its ruling, which
was a clear deviation from precedent, the Court recognized problems that
would inevitably arise as a result of its ruling:
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of
course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18
have already attained a level of maturity some
adults will never reach. For the reasons we have
discussed, however, a line must be drawn. The plurality opinion in Thompson drew the line at 16. In
the intervening years the Thompson plurality’s
conclusion that offenders under 16 may not be executed has not been challenged. The logic of
Thompson extends to those who are under 18. The
age of 18 is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line
for death eligibility ought to rest.65
More assertively pointing out the issues that arise by drawing the line for
the death penalty at the age of eighteen, Justice O’Connor wrote the following in her dissenting opinion:
The Court’s decision today establishes a categorical rule forbidding the execution of any offender
for any crime committed before his 18th birthday,
no matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel the offense. . . . [The majority opinion] fails to establish
that the differences in maturity between 17-yearolds and young “adults” are both universal enough
and significant enough to justify a bright-line
prophylactic rule against capital punishment of the
former. The Court’s analysis is premised on the
differences in the aggregate between juveniles and
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 574.
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adults, which frequently do not hold true when
comparing individuals. . . . Chronological age is
not an unfailing measure of psychological development, and common experience suggests that
many 17-year-olds are more mature than the average young “adult” . . . . Indeed, the age-based line
drawn by the Court is indefensibly arbitrary—it
quite likely will protect a number of offenders who
are mature enough to deserve the death penalty and
may well leave vulnerable many who are not.66
Justice Scalia’s dissent went even further than Justice O’Connor’s comments by attacking the underlying science that was relied upon by the Court
in drawing the line for death at the age of eighteen. Justice Scalia noted that
the American Psychological Association (APA), which provided the Court
with scientific evidence showing that persons under the age of eighteen lack
the ability to take moral responsibility for their decisions, “ha[d] previously
taken precisely the opposite position before this very Court.”67 Justice Scalia explained, “Given the nuances of scientific methodology and conflicting
views, courts—which can only consider the limited evidence on the record
before them—are ill equipped to determine which view of science is the
right one.”68 Furthermore, according to Justice Scalia, even if the Court did
take the scientific evidence presented before it at face value, such evidence
was only able to show that “on average” or “in most cases” juveniles under
the age of eighteen are unable to take moral responsibilities for their actions.69

4.

Graham v. Florida

Nearly five years after Roper was decided, the Supreme Court was
faced with yet another case involving a juvenile and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. In Graham v. Florida, sixteen-year-old Terrance Jamar
Graham was initially arrested for attempted armed robbery, which he plead
guilty to and spent less than one year in jail.70 While on probation, and less
than six months after being released from jail, Graham was arrested again
and found guilty of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery.71 For
such a sequence of crimes, Graham received the maximum sentence al66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 601-02 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005). (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53 (2010).
Id. at 53-57.
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lowed in Florida: life imprisonment for the armed burglary and fifteen years
for the attempted armed robbery.72 Graham appealed his sentence to the
Supreme Court of the United States, and after granting certiorari, the Court
was tasked with answering the following question: “whether the Constitution permits a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without
parole for a nonhomicide crime.”73 In the end, a divided Court held that
sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide crime was unconstitutional because it violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.74 Consistent with
the majority opinions in Atkins and Roper, the Graham court focused heavily upon “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’”75 The Court also acknowledged the scientific studies
regarding juveniles that had been discussed in Roper and stated that “[n]o
recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper
about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments
in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences
between juvenile and adult minds.”76 As such, “Graham [held] that the
Eighth Amendment requires the state to afford the juvenile offender a
‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation,’ and that ‘[a] life without parole sentence improperly
denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.’”77 The Court further found that “[e]ven if the State’s judgment that
Graham was incorrigible were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or
failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate because the judgment was made at the outset[,]”78 because a juvenile offender “will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an
adult offender.”79
While the Graham Court, like the Roper Court, recognized that
“[c]ategorical rules tend to be imperfect,” the Graham Court added that
categorical rules are necessary when dealing with juveniles and the most
severe criminal punishments, especially in light of the alternative, a case-

72.
Id. at 59.
73.
Id. at 52-53.
74.
Id. at 62.
75.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010). (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))).
76.
Id. at 68 (“[P]arts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature
through late adolescence. . . . Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their
actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.”) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
77.
People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 294 (Cal. 2012).
78.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
79.
Id. at 70.
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by-case approach to sentencing.80 According to the Graham Court, the
case-by-case approach would be too difficult and it would be impossible for
the court to “distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the
many that have the capacity for change.”81 A case-by-case approach was
also inferior to a categorical rule because “it does not take account of special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile representation” because
“the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”82
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito warned against the majority’s
departure from the “[d]eath is different” distinction that was made in Roper
and stated:
The Court now claims not only the power categorically to reserve the ‘most severe punishment’ . . .
but also to declare that ‘less culpable’ persons are
categorically exempt from the ‘second most severe
penalty.’ No reliable limiting principle remains to
prevent the Court from immunizing any class of offenders from the law’s third, fourth, fifth or fiftieth
more severe penalties as well.83
Justice Alito further noted that “even if it were relevant, none of this psychological or sociological data is sufficient to support the Court’s ‘moral’
conclusion that youth defeats culpability in every case.”84

5.

Miller v. Alabama

In 2012, the Supreme Court heard a consolidated case regarding two
fourteen-year-old juveniles convicted of murder and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.85 In the first
of the consolidated cases, fourteen-year-old Kuntrell Jackson accompanied
by two other boys, planned to rob a video store.86 On their way to the video
store, they learned that one of the boys was carrying a shotgun.87 Jackson
stayed outside the video store for most of the robbery, but when he entered
the store, one of his co-conspirators shot and killed the store clerk.88 In the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 74.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 103 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 118 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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second of the consolidated cases, Evan Miller and a friend, after an evening
of drinking and drug use with Miller’s neighbor, beat the neighbor and set
his trailer on fire, resulting in the neighbor’s death.89
In holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the automatic sentencing of life without the possibility of parole for minors convicted of
homicide, such as these minors, the Court first discussed the precedent it
laid out in Roper and Graham. “Roper and Graham establish that children
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”90 and
this contention, according to the evidence provided to the Court in Miller,
has only grown stronger.91 Further, “Roper and Graham emphasized that
the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for
imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they
commit terrible crimes.”92 In focusing on the ruling in Graham, the court
noted that “nothing that Graham said about children is crime-specific.
Thus, its reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.”93 The
Court then found that the mandatory sentencing schemes that had been imposed on each minor in Miller “precludes consideration of his chronological
age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”94 As a result, the Court ruled
that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life
in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”95
However, Justice Scalia, still dissenting in Miller, suggested:
Perhaps science and policy suggest society should
show greater mercy to young killers, giving them a
greater chance to reform themselves at the risk that
they will kill again. But that is not our decision to
make. Neither the text of the Constitution nor our
precedent prohibits legislatures from requiring that
juvenile murderers be sentenced to life without parole.96

89.
Id.
90.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
91.
Id. at 2464 n.5 (“The evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the
science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even
stronger.”).
92.
Id. at 2465.
93.
Id. at 2458.
94.
Id. at 2468.
95.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
96.
Id. at 2482 (citation omitted).
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Nevertheless, despite Justice Scalia’s dissent in Miller, and all the other
dissenting opinions in Roper, Graham and Miller, as of 2012, the Supreme
Court has ensured that juveniles under the age of 18 cannot be sentenced to
the death penalty, cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide crime, and cannot automatically be sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole for a homicide crime. As a result, the Supreme Court of the United States, with the help of new scientific MRI studies, has greatly changed the landscape of juvenile punishments from a time
when children over the age of seven could justifiably be sentenced to death
for their crimes. How much farther the Supreme Court will go in shielding
youth criminals from the harshest criminal penalties is unknown.

III. ANALYSIS
A.

NEW SCIENCE SHOWS THE BRAIN CONTINUES TO
DEVELOP UNTIL ONE’S EARLY TWENTIES.

Juveniles have not changed; the imaging available to study their brains
has changed. New imaging techniques, known as functional MRIs, have
“changed the way scientists understand the development of the human brain
as it progresses from childhood through adolescence and into adulthood.”97
By allowing professionals to safely image a youth’s brain on numerous
occasions over time, scientists have discovered that the brain does not fully
develop until much later in life than once thought.98 According to a report
issued by the American Bar Association, “Important changes in adolescent
brain anatomy and activity take place far later in development than previously thought, and those findings could impact how policymakers and the
highest courts are treating teenagers . . . .”99
Prior to functional MRIs,100 it was generally believed that the brain
was fully developed by the age of 12.101 Now, with the advancements in
97.
Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n & the Am. Acad. of Children & Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 121237, at *16 [hereinafter Miller Brief].
98.
“Only in the past few years, with the advent of magnetic resonance imaging
devices (‘MRIs’), have neuroscientists been able safely to conduct longitudinal studies on
the brains of healthy children as they progress through normal developmental stages.” Massie, supra note 11, at 659.
99.
A.B.A., 31 CHILD L. PRAC. 113, 124 (2012).
100.
This insight emerges from sophisticated and non-invasive
brain imaging techniques performed by high-resolution structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”)
methods. These imaging techniques are a quantum leap beyond previous methods for assessing brain development. Be-
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imaging, and specifically functional MRIs, scientists have learned that the
brain goes through “a second wave of synapse formation and a spurt of
growth in the cerebral cortex, followed by a ‘pruning back’ throughout adolescence.”102 As a result, scientists have learned that the brain does not fully
develop until the late teens or early twenties, and the last part of the brain to
develop is the prefrontal cortex, the area of the brain that controls the “executive functions—planning, impulse control and reasoning.”103 As a result, there are real differences between an adult’s brain and an adolescent’s
brain: “Adolescents are less able to control their impulses; they weigh the
risks and rewards of possible conduct differently; and they are less able to
envision the future and apprehend the consequences of their actions.”104 As
stated by the American Psychological Association in its amicus brief to the
Supreme Court, “Even older adolescents who have developed general cognitive capacities similar to those of adults show deficits in these aspects of
social and emotional maturity.”105
These new studies have found their way into the legal system and have
greatly altered the way our courts treat adolescents, especially those facing
the death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole. Interestingly enough, even though the studies are clear in that the brain does not
fully develop until one’s early- to mid-twenties, the Supreme Court has
continued to draw the line for the harshest penalties at the age of 18. As
stated by Dr. Giedd, the physician at the forefront of these scientific studies,
[I]t seems almost arbitrary that our society has decided that a young American is ready to drive a car
at 16, to vote and serve in the Army at 18 and to
drink alcohol at 21. . . . [T]he best estimate for
when the brain is mature is 25, the age at which

fore the rise of neuroimaging, the understanding of brain development was gleaned largely from post-mortem examinations. Modern imaging techniques, however, have begun to
shed light on how a live brain operates, and how a particular
brain develops over time.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *15-16.
101.
Massie, supra note 11, at 660 (“Until these studies, most scientists believed that
the brain had completed its development by around the age of twelve.”); Wallis, supra note
11.
102.
Massie, supra note 11, at 660.
103.
Massie, supra note 11, at 661 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *8 (citing Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 55-56 (2008)).
105.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at 8.
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you can rent a car. Avis must have some pretty sophisticated neuroscientists.106
With the advent of new imaging, scientists have discovered that after
children reach the age of 11 or 12, “there is a second wave of proliferation
and pruning that occurs later in childhood . . . affecting . . . [the] ‘highest
mental functions.’”107 During this wave, neural waxing and waning occurs;
however, unlike the prenatal changes that occur in the brain, “this neural
waxing and waning alters not the number of nerve cells but the number of
connections, or synapses, between them.”108 Thus,
When a child is between the ages of 6 and 12, the
neurons grow bushier, each making dozens of connections to other neurons and creating new pathways for nerve signals. The thickening of all this
grey matter–the neurons and their branchlike dendrites–peaks when girls are about 11 and boys 12
1/2, at which point a serious round of pruning is
under way. Gray matter is thinned out at a rate of
0.7% a year, tapering off in the early 20s. At the
same time, the brain’s white matter thickens. The
white matter is composed of fatty myelin sheaths
that encase axons and, like insulation on a wire,
make nerve-signal transmissions faster and more
efficient.109
As a result, this second wave of proliferation verifies that the brain does not
fully develop until one’s early twenties.110
These new findings are significant because the part of the brain that is
last to develop is the prefrontal cortex, which according to Dr. Giedd, is
also the “CEO” or “executive of the brain.”111 This is because the frontal
lobe “govern[s] impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight of
106.
Wallis, supra note 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, according to
Ruben Gur, MD, PhD and Director at the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, “The
evidence now is strong that the brain does not cease to mature until the early 20s in those
relevant parts that govern impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight of consequences, and other characteristics that make people morally culpable . . . .” Ortiz, supra note
11.
107.
Wallis, supra note 11.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Massie, supra note 11, at 661 (“Researchers are uncertain as to how long the
brain’s maturation process goes on, but they believe that it continues into young adulthood,
at least through the early twenties.”).
111.
Massie, supra note 11, at 661.
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consequences, and other characteristics that make people morally culpable .
. . . ”112 Dr. Giedd goes so far as to state that “it’s [the] part of the brain that
most separates man from beast.”113 As a result of this late development in
the brain, even though teenagers may seem “physically mature, they may
not appreciate the consequences or weigh information the same way adults
do. So . . . [although] somebody looks physically mature, their brain may in
fact not be mature.” 114 Along the same lines, Dr. Laurence Steinberg states
[A]dolescents mature intellectually before they mature socially or emotionally, a fact that helps explain why teenagers who are so smart in some respects do surprisingly dumb things . . . . From a
neuroscientific standpoint, it therefore makes perfect sense to have a lower age for autonomous
medical decision making than for eligibility for
capital punishment, because certain brain systems
mature earlier than others.115
Because the frontal lobe develops last, youth are more likely than adults to
engage in risky behavior, to be impulsive, to not think through their actions
and to follow the behavior of others.116 “For example, from adolescence
into early childhood, there is a strengthening of activity in brain systems
involving self-regulation, and functional MRIs have shown that reward
centers in the adolescent brain are activated more than in children or adults .
. . .”117 This means that “[h]eightened sensitivity to anticipated rewards
motivates adolescents to engage in risky acts, such as unprotected sex, fast
driving or drugs when the potential for pleasure is high. This hypersensitivi112.
Ortiz, supra note 11.
113.
Massie, supra note 11, at 661 (quoting statement of Dr. Jay Giedd).
114.
Ortiz, supra note 11, at 2.
115.
A.B.A., supra note 99, at 124(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Andrea MacIver, Suicide Causation Experts in Teen Wrongful Death Cases: Will They Assist
the Trier of Fact?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 51 (2011) (suggesting that experts would be
necessary to explain the complexities of the development of a youth’s brain in suicide cases).
116.
More generally, the late development of the frontal lobe, responsible for the ‘executive functions,’ may help to account
for teenagers’ willingness to indulge in risky behaviors, including experimentation with alcohol and drugs. Research also
indicates that young people are more willing to take risks in
the presence of friends than when they are alone.
Massie, supra note 98, at 662.
117.
A.B.A., supra note 99, at 124.
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ty to reward is particularly pronounced when they’re with their friends.”118
Similarly, adolescents have a difficult time in exercising self-control and, as
a result, adolescents statistically are overrepresented in virtually every category of risky behavior.119
Further, adolescents “lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”120 Adolescents as whole “have less life experience on which to draw, making it
less likely that they will fully apprehend the potential negative consequences of their actions.”121 In other words, “children characteristically lack the
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.”122 As a result, “adolescents are
likely less capable than adults are in using these capacities in making realworld choices, partly because of [a] lack of experience and partly because
teens are less efficient than adults in processing information.”123 As such,
the ability to realistically think about the future increases with age and continues to develop through one’s early twenties.124
Due to adolescents’ developmental immaturity, they are also “more
susceptible than adults to the negative influences of their environment, and
their actions are shaped directly by family and peers in ways that adults’ are
not.”125 As such, adolescents are easily influenced by their peers, both directly and indirectly. “In some contexts, adolescents might make choices in
response to direct peer pressure, as when they are coerced to take risks that
they might otherwise avoid. More indirectly, adolescents’ desire for peer
approval, and consequent fear of rejection affects their choices even without direct coercion.”126

118.
A.B.A., supra note 99, at 124 (quoting Laurence Steinberg, PhD) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119.
Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony
Murder in the Wake of Rope, Graham, & JDB, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 297, 313 (SpringSummer 2012).
120.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (quoting Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *3-4 (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 351-52 (1992)).
122.
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2397.
123.
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILD 15, 20 (2008).
124.
See Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the
Development of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 28-29
(1991).
125.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *15.
126.
Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 469 (2009).
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Additionally, “[m]ost juveniles who engage in criminal activity are not
destined to become life-long criminals,”127 and even youth who commit
serious crimes “are likely to outgrow these behaviors.”128 Frequently, adolescent criminal conduct is the result of experimentation with risky behavior
rather than any deep-rooted moral deficiency.129 “Only a small proportion
of adolescents who experiment with illegal activities will develop an entrenched pattern of criminal behavior that persists into adulthood; ‘the vast
majority of adolescents who engage in criminal or delinquent behavior desist from crime as they mature.’”130 However, despite these findings, experts still cannot say with any reliability whether a particular juvenile will
outgrow his or her criminal tendencies.131
Based upon these findings regarding the development of the brain and
the conclusions that have been drawn from them, our courts have decided
that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment
dictates that minors be treated differently than adults when imposing the
harshest penalties.132 This is because youth do not process or make decisions in the same way as adults, and these differences in the decisionmaking process are the result of scientific differences in the way the brain
develops.
Because of these differences, juvenile offenders are
not making the same calculations as adults when
they participate in felonies. They are not as likely
to be weighing the risks of their involvement, including the risk that someone might get hurt or
killed. When confronted with the prospect of shortterm rewards—from approval of their peers to any
tangible rewards from the felony itself—juveniles
127.
Keller, supra note 119, at 315 (referencing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
128.
Keller, supra note 119, at 315.
129.
Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 686 (1993).
130.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *21 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 1009, 1014-15 (2003)).
131.
See Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *21-22.
132.
Marsha Levick et al., Article, The Eighth Amendments Evolves: Defining Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15 U. PA. J. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 285, 299 (2012) (“Youths’ developmental immaturity leads them to function
differently than adults in independent functioning, decision-making, emotion regulation, and
general cognitive processing. These differences have been observed in behavioral studies as
well as studies documenting neurological changes that take place during adolescence and
early adulthood. Adolescents’ resulting deficits in certain areas, such as decision-making and
impulsivity, along with their heightened vulnerability and the inherently transitory nature of
adolescence, suggest that they should be treated differently under the Eighth Amendment.”).
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are more likely to prioritize those rewards over any
long-term consequences.133
Accordingly, adolescents are more apt to take risks without weighing
the consequences and they are more susceptible to negative influences from
outside pressure.134
B.

FUNCTIONAL MRI STUDIES ARISE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM

For better or for worse, science, and more specifically these studies
about the way in which the brain develops, has made its way into the judicial system. As is apparent from the Roper, Graham and Miller opinions,
the scientific research submitted to the Court by attorneys and scientific and
medical experts through amicus briefs had a profound impact on the outcome of those cases, and more generally, on the meaning of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause itself. And, while science was introduced to the
Court both in favor of expanding the rights of juveniles as well as limiting
the rights of juveniles, in either case, experts are helping to shape policy
and legal discussion when it comes to youth and the harshest criminal penalties imposed by courts.135
In Roper, the American Medical Association (AMA) submitted an
amicus brief.136 Within that brief, the AMA stated that “[t]o a degree never
before understood, scientists can now demonstrate that adolescents are immature not only to the observer’s naked eye, but in the vey fibers of their
brains.”137 The AMA further reported:
Adolescent brains are not fully developed in regions related to reasoning, risk taking, and impulse
control. Even more groundbreaking than the evidence of brain activity is the recent reevaluation,
confirmed through brain imaging studies, that the
brain’s frontal lobes are still structurally immature
well into late adolescence. The prefrontal cortex
(which . . . is most associated with impulse control,

133.
Keller, supra note 119, at 315.
134.
Keller, supra note 119, at 313-15.
135.
American Bar Association, 31 No. 9 CHILD L. PRAC. 124 (Sept. 2012) (quoting
Laurence Steinberg, PhD).
136.
The American Medical Association was just one of many parties to file amicus
briefs in Roper.
137.
Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *10 [hereinafter Roper Brief].
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risk assessment, and moral reasoning) is “one of
the last brain regions to mature.”138
The AMA concludes that such studies have shown that “the regions of the
brain associated with impulse control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning
develop last, after late adolescence.”139
In Graham, the Court received a brief from the American Psychiatric
Association (APA), which emphasized the new brain studies and the impact
they should have on sentencing minors. “[R]ecent neuroscience research
shows that adolescent brains are not yet fully developed in regions related
to higher-order functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk
evaluation.”140 The APA recognized that “[s]cience cannot, of course, draw
bright lines precisely demarcating the boundaries between childhood, adolescence and adulthood,”141 however it noted that “qualities that distinguish
juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.”142 An
adolescent can only learn through his or her experiences and such a “process will probably not be completed until very late in the teen years . . . .
[E]xpecting the experienced-based ability to resist impulses to be fully
formed prior to age eighteen or nineteen would seem on present evidence to
be wishful thinking.”143 Further, the APA reported to the Court that
“[e]mpirical research confirms that adolescents—even old adolescents—
have not fully developed these abilities and hence lack an adult’s capacity
for mature judgment.”144 “[M]ost identity development takes place during
the late teens and early twenties”145 and as a result “[c]oherent integration
of identity does not occur until late adolescence or early adulthood; the final
stages of this process often occur in the college years.”146

138.
Roper Brief, supra note 137, at 16 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
139.
Roper Brief, supra note 137, at 11.
140.
Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL
2247126, at *4 [hereinafter Graham Brief].
141.
Graham Brief, supra note 140, at 6 n.3.
142.
Graham Brief, supra note 140, at 6 n.3 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 574) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
143.
Graham Brief, supra note 140, at 10 (quoting Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offenders, in Youth on Trial 271, 280 (Thomas Grisso & Robert
G. Schwartz eds., 2000)).
144.
Graham Brief, supra note 140, at 13.
145.
Graham Brief, supra note 140, at 19 n.39 (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice 9, 27 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds,
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (parentheses omitted) ).
146.
Graham Brief, supra note 140, at 19 n.39 (providing parenthetical information
to Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Rethinking Juvenile Justice 38 (2008)).
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And, by the time Miller was decided in 2012, amicus briefs again inundated the Court. These briefs, however, relied heavily on research and
studies already cited before the Court in Roper and Graham, and merely
emphasized that over time, the science backing such research has only
grown stronger. According to the American Psychological Association,
American Psychiatric Association, and National Association of Social
Workers,
an ever-growing body of research in developmental
psychology and neuroscience continues to confirm
and strengthen the Court’s conclusions[:] Compared to adults, juveniles are less able to restrain
their impulses and exercise self-control; less capable of considering alternative courses of action and
avoiding unduly risky behaviors; and less oriented
to the future and thus less attentive to the consequences of their often-impulsive actions. Research
also continues to demonstrate that ‘juveniles are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,’ while at the same time they lack the freedom
and autonomy that adults possess to escape such
pressures.147
As such, this “research continues to confirm and expand upon the fundamental insight underlying this Court's previous decisions[:] Juveniles’
profound differences from adults undermine the possible penological justifications for punishing a juvenile offender with a sentence that ‘guarantees
he will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’”148 “By now, ‘[t]here is incontrovertible evidence of significant
changes in the brain structure and function during adolescence,’ and
‘[a]lthough most of this work has appeared just in the last 10 years, there is
already strong consensus among developmental neuroscientists about the
nature of’ these changes.”149 Similarly, as stated in the brief of the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,

147.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *3-4 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
148.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *5.
149.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *3-4 (quoting Laurence Steinberg, Should the
Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
739, 742 (2009)).

24

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

35

[E]ach time this Court has examined the constitutional limitations of imposing severe penalties on
juvenile offenders, the scientific research on the
development of the adolescent brain has grown.
This research establishes that the brain systems that
are crucial for exerting cognitive control over behavior and processing rewards are still immature
during adolescence.150
And, in a brief authored by numerous former juvenile court judges, the authors point out the studies relied on in the Court’s rulings in both Roper and
Graham and emphasize that “the seriousness of the offense simply does not
change the fundamental characteristics of the [juvenile] offender.”151
As is obvious from the opinions issued in Roper, Graham and Miller,
the Supreme Court judges, who are not scientists, medical doctors, or psychiatric experts, relied very heavily on the scientific research submitted by
the outside community in making drastic changes in juvenile sentencing—
from a time when a child over the age of seven could be sentenced to death,
to 2013, when the Supreme Court had categorically prohibited any offender
under the age of eighteen from receiving the death penalty, life without the
possibility of parole for nonhomicide crimes, and automatic life without the
possibility of parole for homicide crimes.152 These are drastic changes in
the sentencing of juveniles that simply would not have been possible without the scientific research to support them.
C.

WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN FOR YOUTH, LIKE NINETEENYEAR-OLD DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV, WHO FALLS INTO THE
“GREY AREA”?

Miller almost certainly will not be the Supreme Court’s final word on
the cruel and unusual punishment clause’s impact on juvenile offenders,
especially since there remains a disconnect between science and the law as
it stands. As pointed out above, while the courts have continued to draw the
line for the harshest criminal penalties at the age of eighteen, science would
suggest that the line be drawn somewhere around the early-to-mid twenties.
So what happens to these nineteen, twenty and twenty-something year olds
150.
Miller Brief, supra note 97, at *36 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
151.
Brief of Former Juvenile Court Judges as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 7-8, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL
135044, at *7-8.
152.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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who fall into this “grey area”153 between where the law draws the line and
where science draws the line? We have already seen juveniles push the limits of the rulings the Supreme Court handed down in Roper, Graham, and
Miller by challenging sentences that are extremely lengthy, but fall short of
death or life without the possibility of parole,154 and successfully challenging sentences that are not labeled “life without the possibility of parole,”
but function as the equivalent of life without the possibility of parole.155
Without question, lawyers will point out to the courts (and ultimately
the Supreme Court of the United States) the fact that juveniles under the
age of 18 are being spared of the harshest criminal penalties even though
the scientific studies relied upon in Roper, Graham, and Miller would suggest nineteen, twenty and even youth in their early- to mid-twenties be
spared of those harshest criminal penalties too. There is no doubt that such
challenges will be made by youths who fall into this grey area. However,
whether those challenges will be successful is a question that is less certain
in light of the factual circumstances surrounding each case (sometimes very
horrific), the inherent nature of science (always evolving), and the Court’s
desire to draw lines (here, to draw the line for the harshest criminal penalties at 18 years old).156 And, although experts and scientists are confident in
the scientific research regarding the brain’s development as it stands
now,157 who is to say there won’t be new developments in the future? And,
153.
The “grey area” refers to nineteen year old, twenty year old and early-to-mid
twenty year old youth offenders who the law recognizes as being eligible for the harshest
criminal penalties even though science suggests they should not be eligible for such criminal
penalties.
154.
See People v. Perez, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 114 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 4, 2013), review filed (Apr. 4, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 527 (2013) (defendant unsuccessfully argues that his 30 years to life sentence for offenses committed at age 16, including two counts of forcible lewd act upon child under the age
of 14, violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause); People v. Rocha, No. 11CF0470,
2013 WL 4774758 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2013) (juvenile defendant unsuccessfully
challenged his sentence of forty years to life in prison).
155.
See People v. Kidd, Nos. C062075, C062512, 2012 WL 243250, at *20-23 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2013) (unconstitutional for the court to sentence a fifteen year old to a 90.5
year sentence and a seventeen year old a eighty-five year sentence before becoming eligible
for parole). But see People v. Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 920, 925-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(court upheld a 110-year life sentences and explicitly rejected the idea that Graham should
apply to virtual life cases).
156.
In Gladden v. Kerestes, defendant, who was convicted of murder, argued that
even though he was over the age of eighteen at the time he committed the murder, the ruling
in Miller should be applied to those who are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five,
which he was. Gladden v. Kerestes, No. 13-3617, 2013 WL 6846939, at *3-4 (E.D. Penn.
Dec. 27, 2013). The court found that defendant was “seeking to apply a new rule, which has
not been recognized by the Supreme Court” and therefore, defendant’s claim “lack[ed] potential merit.” Id.
157.
See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
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even with fool proof science, will the courts be willing to part with the
now-engrained principle of drawing the line at eighteen?158
Further complicating this clash between science and the law159 is the
fact that science cannot give us an exact answer—experts cannot definitively say “whether or not a child’s actions are characteristics that ‘reflec[t]
unfortunate yet transient immaturity or rare irreparable corruption.’”160 In
other words, when a youth commits a crime, it is impossible to know
whether that crime is the result of true criminal behavior that will continue
in the future or the result of an immature youth who will grow out of such
behavior. Nevertheless, while this complicating factor applies to youth that
fall into the grey area, it applies equally to youth under the age of eighteen,
too,161 and our courts have acknowledged that drawing the line at eighteen
might be over inclusive and might save that lives of some who do not deserve to be saved.162
158.
Prior to Roper, which was decided in 2005, the Court had drawn the line at the
age of 16. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (showing that the Court is
willing to redraw the line when faced with the right circumstances.).
159.
See David Goodstein, How Science Works, in Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence 67, 80-82 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2d ed. 2000) (examining fundamental differences in science and law). (“[S]cience and the law differ fundamentally in their objectives. The objective of the law is justice; that of science is truth. These are not at all the same
thing. Justice, of course, also seeks truth, but it requires that a clear decision be made in a
reasonable and limited amount of time. . . . Both disciplines seek, in structured debate, using
empirical evidence, to arrive at rational conclusions that transcend the prejudices and selfinterest of individuals.”); David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections
and Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 661, 679 (2000) (“Science and the law play by wholly different sets of rules.
Yet, they play on the same fields, and therefore they have to decide by which set of rules
they will abide. The law is, at bottom, a normative institution. It is also practical and pragmatic, but its success is measured by values and morals. The law is a consumer of information with the purpose of producing fair, just, equitable, and efficient outcomes. Psychology is a producer of information. It ought to transcend practical politics, seeking information
that transcends legal contexts and, if possible, social contexts.”).
160.
Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide a Meaningful
Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 310, 312 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 67 (2010); (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005))); Roper, 543
U.S. at573 (2005) (“It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”).
161.
Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming
Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 26 (2012) (“Graham suffers
from the faulty premises that juveniles who commit heinous crimes are typical juveniles, and
that they are categorically less culpable than young adult offenders.”).
162.
This means that some sixteen and seventeen year old who consciously commit
crimes as part of an irreparable criminal trait will escape receiving the harshest criminal
penalties.
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In the case of the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, experts and scientists will not be
able to definitively say whether his actions leading up to, after, and on Patriot’s Day were the result of an undeveloped brain vulnerable to negative
influences, or whether those actions were conscious decisions that were part
of irreparable criminal tendencies, or both. What experts and scientists will
be able to definitively say, though, is that as a nineteen year old, Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev’s brain had not yet fully developed.163 In the past, as is evident
from Roper, Graham, and Miller, this fact—that the brain was not fully
developed—was sufficient to spare juvenile offenders under the age of 18
of the harshest criminal penalties, regardless of the crime committed.164 As
stated by the court in Roper, “The differences between juvenile and adult
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful
person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”165
However, given that we know that these scientific studies show that the
brain is not fully developed until one’s early- to mid-twenties, it would not
defy logic if they were not considered when sentencing those who are directly implicated by them, i.e. those who fall in the grey area? And, yes,
that would include Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.166
From what we know about Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, it appears that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev exhibited many of the characteristics (discussed above) typically found in a youth with a brain that is not yet fully developed. First, and
most obvious, he falls into the grey area—at nineteen years old, he does not
categorically fall into the class of juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen who cannot receive the death penalty or automatic life without the possibility of parole, but he does fall into the class of youth that science recognizes as having brains that are not yet fully developed. Second, while
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s crime appeared to be very well-planned and thought
163.
See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
164.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487 (2012) (As stated by Justice Alito in
his dissenting opinion in Miller, “Even a 171/2–year–old who sets off a bomb in a crowded
mall or guns down a dozen students and teachers is a ‘child’ and must be given a chance to
persuade a judge to permit his release into society. Nothing in the Constitution supports this
arrogation of legislative authority.”).
165.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005).
166.
The example of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is used in this Article to show just how
powerful the clash between science and the law can be, and is in the case of youth offenders
facing the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole. This Article takes the reader
through all the scientific studies, which clearly demonstrate how and why a youth’s brain is
not fully developed until one’s early- to mid-twenties, and then shows how the Supreme
Court of the United States accepted and truly relied on these studies in its holdings in Roper,
Graham, and Miller (in effect legitimizing the studies in a legal setting). The Article attempts to get the reader to buy into the scientific studies, which they should. But then, after
the discussion of the scientific studies and the Court's application of those studies is over, the
Article asks the reader to apply them to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the nineteen-year-old who set
off home-made bombs on the crowded streets of Boston during the 2013 Boston Marathon.
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out,167 numerous reports have indicated that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev may have
been heavily influenced by his older brother, especially with respect to the
plotting and planning of the marathon bombing.168 Further, in the time leading up to the Boston Marathon, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was increasingly engaging in risky behaviors: drinking alcohol, doing drugs and selling marijuana, an activity that often brought in one thousand dollars in cash or more
per week.169 He was also extremely vulnerable to peer pressure, especially
from his brother,170 someone who was believed to have been plagued by
“inner voices,” who thought someone was trying to control him and “‘make
him do something,’” and who was increasingly engaging in extremist Islam
practices. 171 And Dzhokhar Tsarnaev came from a family where run-ins
with the law were all too common.172 From what is currently known, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev fits the profile of a teenager whose brain was not yet fully
developed and who was in an environment where he could easily be swayed
by negative peer pressures. In these ways, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev fits the profile of a youth who the Supreme Court previously found should be protected from being sentenced to the harshest criminal penalties.173 However,
because Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was nineteen years old at the time he committed his crimes, he remains eligible for, and has been charged with, the death
penalty, regardless of what the scientific studies say.
167.
Just prior to being captured by the police, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev wrote the following messages in the boat where he was found: “The U.S. Government is killing our innocent
civilians. I can’t stand to see such evil unpunished. We Muslims are one body, you hurt one
you hurt us all. Now I don’t like killing innocent people[,] it is forbidden in Islam[;] but due
to said (unintelligible)[,] it is allowed.” Feyerick, supra note 6 (quoting Tsarnaev) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
168.
See Drash, supra note 5 (“At 26, Tamerlan was seven years older than his
brother Dzhokhar, who followed his big brother around like a puppy.”); see also Feyerick,
supra note 6 (“Tsarnaev’s lawyers could argue that he was under the ‘mesmerizing influence’ of Tamerlan, his older brother.”); Janet Reitman, Jahar’s World, ROLLING STONE (July
17, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/jahars-world-20130717 (“Jahar
[Dzhokhar Tsarnaev] idolized his older brother, Tamerlan - all the children appeared to - and
as a child, he followed his brother’s example and learned to box. . . . ‘His brother must have
brainwashed him,’ says Sam [a friend of Tsarnaev]. ‘It’s the only explanation.’”).
169.
Josie Jammet, The Fall of the House of Tsarnaev, B. GLOBE (Dec. 15, 2013)
http://www.bostonglobe.com/Page/Boston/20112020/WebGraphics/Metro/BostonGlobe.com/2013/12/15tsarnaev/tsarnaev.html.
170.
See Drash supra note 5 (Tsarnaev was said to follow his older brother “like a
puppy.”)
171.
See Jammet, supra note 169 (quoting Don Larking, a friend of Tamerlan) It has
been speculated that Tamerlan likely suffered from some form of schizophrenia because of
the voices he claimed to be hearing, smoking marijuana, and the head trauma he had suffered throughout his years of boxing. Id.
172.
See Jammet, supra note 169.
173.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

2014]

THE CLASH BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THE LAW

29

If the scientific studies regarding the development of the brain were
considered in the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who faces the death penalty if
convicted,174 it is possible that the court could rule that it is unconstitutional
to sentence him with the death penalty or automatic life without the possibility of parole. In a real sense, science could save Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s
life. And, based on the Court’s rulings in Roper, Graham, and Miller, science should save Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s life. First, experts and scientists
have concluded that the brain is not fully developed until one’s early- to
mid-twenties. As a result, at nineteen years old, science tells us that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s brain was not fully developed when he committed his
crimes.175 Second, the Supreme Court of the United States has relied on the
scientific studies that tell us the brain is not fully developed until one’s early- to mid-twenties to hold that it is cruel and unusual to punish youth under
the age of eighteen to death or automatic life without the possibility of parole.176 Thus, the Supreme Court had already validated these scientific studies and even used them in support of its rulings save juveniles under the age
of eighteen from the harshest criminal penalties. Accordingly, it does not
make much sense for the courts not to consider these scientific studies when
sentencing Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—not only do the studies apply to him, but
the Supreme Court has relied on the studies before. Given Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s horrific actions, it is difficult to say that he is not deserving of the
harshest criminal penalty allowed by our legal system, but if our judicial
system truly buys into the scientific studies about the development of the
brain, and the Supreme Court of the United States appeared to buy into these studies in Roper, Graham, and Miller, our legal precedent on the cruel
and unusual punishment clause demands that the death penalty be taken off
the table for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
Here is where the concerns of the dissenting opinions in Roper, Graham, and Miller come to life. Justice Alito, in his dissenting opinion in Miller, disagreed with the majority opinion because it made it possible for
“even a 171/2–year–old who sets off a bomb in a crowded mall or guns
down a dozen students and teachers . . . to persuade a judge to permit his
release into society.”177 Accordingly, Justice Alito points out that there are
some crimes that are just too heinous to warrant protection from the harshest criminal penalties, regardless of the offender’s age. And in the case of
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, given the crimes he has committed, the death penalty

174.
Catherine E. Shoichet, For Boston bombing victims, death penalty decision a
‘step
forward’,
CNN.COM
(January
31,
2014,
10:41
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/30/justice/tsarnaev-death-penalty/index.html?hpt=ju_c2.
175.
See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
176.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560; Graham, 560 U.S. at 48; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.
177.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2487.
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will remain fair game, 178 even if science says it should not.179 Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev’s crimes were too heinous, in the eyes of most, more heinous than
the crimes committed by the youth in Roper, Graham, and Miller combined. As a result, when the Attorney General announced his decision to
seek the death penalty for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s crimes, he stated: “The
nature of the conduct at issue and the resultant harm compel this decision
[to seek the death penalty].”180 And while the Supreme Court in Roper,
Graham, and Miller made it clear that their rulings applied regardless of the
crime committed, this is a case where the Court cannot overlook the nature
of the crime.181 In this case, the law, and the line that has been drawn at
eighteen for over a decade, has the support of emotion (or what the Supreme Court has referred to as the “objective indicia of society’s standards”),182 and for that reason science will not save Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s
178.
Sebastian Murdock, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Boston Bombing Suspect, Has Life or
Death Resting in Attorney General, THE HUFFINGTON POST (December 1, 2013)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/01/boston-bombing-death-penalty_n_4367908.html
(“If you put a bomb down in a crowd, it becomes one of those cases where you say, ‘If not
now, when do you ever certify a case as a death penalty case?’”).
179.
See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text. Joshua Greene, a philosopher at
Harvard University, believes that “neuroscience will challenge and ‘reshape our intuitive
sense of justice.’” Adam B. Shniderman, The Devil’s Advocate: Using Nueroscientific Evidence in International Criminal Trials?, 38 BROOK J. INT’L L. 655, 655 (2013) (quoting
Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B. 1775, 1775 (2004)).
180.
See Shoichet, supra note 174. See also Tsarnaev Indicatment, supra note 1. In a
December 1, 2013 article, the Huffington Post reported that while seventy percent of those
people interviewed by the Huffington Post were in favor of seeking the death penalty against
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, only thirty-three percent of Boston Globe readers were in favor of the
death penalty, and a Massachusetts jury will ultimately decide the issue. See Murdock, supra
note 178. It will be up to the Attorney General to decide whether to seek the death penalty.
(“‘It’s one thing for the government to be willing to impose the death penalty; it will be a lot
harder to find people in Massachusetts to serve on a jury who would vote for the death penalty,’ said Andrew Smith, director of the University of New Hampshire Survey Center. ‘It’s
not terribly surprising given that it is Massachusetts.’ Holder will also have to consider
Tsarnaev’s youth, and whether or not his older brother may have intimidated him into taking
part in the bombings, Richard Dieter, executive director of the Death Penalty Information
Center, told USA Today.”) Id.
181.
As correctly noted by Adam B. Shniderman, there would need to be a willingness on the part of the courts to accept the scientific studies before any change can occur.
Shniderman, supra note 179. (“Even when science can shed light on issues, how far will the
law go in response to science?”).
182.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005). What is referred to as emotion in
this Article, could easily equate in many ways to the “national consensus” or the “objective
indicia of society’s standards” as referred to by the Supreme Court in Roper, Graham and
Miller. In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court relied heavily on a national consensus and
the objective indicia of society. Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (“The objective indicia of consensus
in this case—the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend to-
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life.183 Dzhokhar Tsarnaev set off a bomb in the middle of an area crowded
with innocent men, women, and children—if the death penalty is not warranted here, when would it ever be warranted? But, maybe the Supreme
Court will shock us and hold true to the scientific studies that it relied upon
so heavily in Roper, Graham, and Miller—after all, it does appear that the
Court was beginning to stray from the “objective indicia of society’s standards” principle in Miller.184 But, given the horrific nature of this case and
the crimes committed by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, that seems unlikely.
That is not to say that science will not win down the road. It seems inevitable that there will be a case where a nineteen-year-old commits a different, less-heinous crime where the line at eighteen has a better chance of
being effectively redrawn.185 After all, science tells us that the line must be

ward abolition of the practice—provide sufficient evidence that today our society views
juveniles . . . .”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (“The sentencing practice now
under consideration is exceedingly rare[] [a]nd ‘it is fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it.’”). However, interestingly, in Miller, the Supreme Court seems to stray
away from the “objective indicia of society’s standards” analysis. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.
Ct. 2455, 2480 (2012) (“In the end, the Court does not actually conclude that mandatory life
sentences for juvenile murderers are unusual. It instead claims that precedent ‘leads to’
today’s decision, primarily relying on Graham and Roper”). This suggests that the Court in
Miller was allowing science to prevail.
183.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002)) (“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow
category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most
deserving of execution.’”).
184.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477, 2480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of
course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.
For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn.”); Shniderman, supra
note 179.
In all legal systems, society is forced to draw lines that hold
some individuals responsible, but not others. Even among
those that can be held criminally responsible, there are further
categorical divisions. For example, the United State Supreme
Court has distinguished several classes of people for whom the
available punishments are limited, i.e., prohibiting execution
of minors and mentally retarded, based on assumptions about
the agency and capacity of the actor. Implicitly, there lines are
drawn on concepts of morality and justice, sometimes rooted
in scientific knowledge about human behavior. Certainly, the
bright line distinctions that society and law create do not perfectly fit the real world. Is a person with an IQ of 71 so radically different than a person with an IQ of 69, such that the
former is eligible to be executed while the latter is not? Is the
brain of a nineteen-year-old so significantly different from a
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redrawn.186 However, until that case makes its way to the Supreme Court,
those nineteen, twenty, and twenty-something year-olds will remain caught
in the grey area, where the difference between life and death is potentially
only one Supreme Court decision away.

IV. CONCLUSION
“The United States Supreme Court has established that juveniles are
different than adults in constitutionally relevant ways, including for the
purposes of the Eighth Amendment assessment of cruel and unusual punishment.”187 This established principle—that juveniles are different than
adults—is largely based upon scientific studies that show the brain is not
fully developed until one’s early- to mid-twenties.188 In light of such findings, we must ask if it still makes sense to draw the line at the age of eighteen when it comes to the most severe criminal punishments, including the
death penalty. In the case of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, prosecutors are seeking
the death penalty for the nineteen-year-old who set off a bomb in a crowded
area of innocent civilians. He is nineteen after all, and the law, as it stands,
allows for that. However, as a nineteen-year-old, Dzhokhar falls into the
grey area—the area where science recognizes that his brain is not fully developed, but where the law punishes him as an adult regardless. There is no
doubt that someone who takes the lives of innocent people deserves the
strongest penalty allowed by law. However, our legal system has held that it
is cruel and unusual to sentence persons under the age of eighteen to death
seventeen-year-old that the former should be eligible for execution, while the latter should not?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Also, interestingly, the Supreme Court made the following statements in Miller:
Our Eighth Amendment cases have also said that we should
take guidance from ‘evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.’ Mercy toward the guilty
can be a form of decency, and a maturing society may abandon
harsh punishments that it comes to view as unnecessary or unjust. But decency is not the same as leniency. A decent society
protects the innocent from violence. A mature society may determine that this requires removing those guilty of the most
heinous murders from its midst, both as protection for its other
members and as a concrete expression of its standards of decency. As judges we have no basis for deciding that progress
toward greater decency can move only in the direction of easing sanctions on the guilty.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2478 (citations omitted).
186.
See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
187.
Keller, supra note 119.
188.
See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
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or automatic life without the possibility of parole regardless of the crime
they have committed based on scientific studies that indicate they are less
mature and less suitable for receiving such serious punishments.189 And,
those scientific studies that were used to spare youth under the age of eighteen from the harshest criminal penalties apply equally to youth between the
ages of eighteen and their early- to mid-twenties, which includes Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev. Due to the severity of his crimes, however, the Supreme Court
and society will not be ready to unilaterally take the death penalty off the
table for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. This is where the clash between science and
the law rears its head—science may suggest that nineteen-year-old Dzhokhar Tsarnaev should not be eligible to receive the death penalty (or automatic life without the possibility of parole), but because the law draws that
line at eighteen, he is eligible for whatever sentence he receives, including
death. Inevitably, the Supreme Court will have to address this disconnect
between its legal rulings and science.190 However, until then, the line will
remain at eighteen, where it is of no help to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev or any other offenders who fall into the grey area.

189.
See supra notes 97-134 and accompanying text.
190.
“As technology evolves and advances, science and law will become more deeply entwined.” Justice Ming W. Chin et al., Introduction, FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE: SCIENCE
AND THE LAW § 13:1 (April 2013); see also Michael C. Mason, The Scientific Evidence
Problem: A Philosophical Approach, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 887, 900 (2001) (“Scientific evidence
is valuable because of its potential to help judges and juries find truth.”); David L. Faigman,
The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts
in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 681 (2000)
(“Science and the law are two wholly different institutions, with very different histories,
different methodologies, different standards for success, and different objectives. In our
world they are both indispensable, but not reconcilable. We should not wish them to be. In
some ways, they are like the branches of the federal government, which were created, in
part, to check the excesses and jealousies of one another. They share power, but they also
check one another’s power.”).

